For nearly 50 years the U.S. was the leading producer of automobiles worldwide. By 1980 this dominance had shifted considerably with the Japanese taking the number one position from the U.S. American automobile manufacturers had been sleeping at the wheel while the Japanese developed the concept of lean manufacturing and produced quality, inexpensive, fuel efficient automobiles. They put their cars on the market in the U.S. and Americans bought Japanese instead of expensive, large, inefficient U.S. automobiles.
In mid 1982, General Motors launched a plan to combat the Japanese intrusion into the American market place. The plan was called the Saturn Corporation. It took eight years and a huge capital investment to produce the first car but the Saturn cars are cutting into the Japanese stronghold on the small car market in the U.S.
Saturn Corporation could become the model for General Motors divisions of the future. What has been learned at Saturn is shared, studied and incorporated where applicable in other GM motor divisions. This case study tells the Saturn story from it's inception to present (early 1993). saturn car,saturn automobile,saturn for sale,saturn service manuals,saturn owner's manuals,saturn user manuals.
America didn't invent the automobile, but there was a time when it was the world's leader in automotive design and manufacturing. U.S. auto makers shared their knowledge with Europe and Japan-- then, they paid no attention to what Japan did with what they learned. Japan took what they learned, added their culture and work ethic, and "ate U.S. auto makers for lunch." The U.S. produced 4 out of 5 automobiles sold in the world in 1940. By 1960, the U.S. share of the world market dropped to 50% and today our share has become a mere 25%. Has the U.S. lost the competitive edge?
Saturn Corporation was born from the economic and social realities within General Motors (GM) and the United Auto Workers UAW) in the early '80s. In 1981, GM was experiencing financial losses, a prolonged U.S. recession, and an escalating loss of market share to foreign competitors. During this crisis, nearly 170,000 GM/UAW employes were laid off.
Responding to this challenge, GM began to scrutinize its American automobile production. In June of 1982, GM's Advanced Product and Design Team was asked to answer the question, "Can G.M. build a world-class-quality small car in the U.S. that can compete successfully with the imports?" They set up a "small car project" and they adopted a "clean-sheet"approach, avowing they would not be restricted by traditional thinking and industry practices. Perhaps by applying an unobstructed mind to any and all problems, new approaches and solutions could be found like lost-foam casting and high-speed machining techniques. These were two of the concepts that were evaluated and adapted as high risk but possible solutions to the challenge.
Meanwhile, another team was forming. Alfred S. Warren, vice president of GM's Industrial Relations Staff, and Donald Ephlin, UAW vice president and director of the General Motors Department, were increasingly dissatisfied with the labor relations climate. They decided to bring together a handful of people to figure out if there was a better way to do business. This handful soon realized the enormity of the question and reached out for additional team members. By the time they had finished, they were an unprecedented alliance of GM and UAW people - plant managers, superintendents, union committeemen, production workers, and skilled tradesmen along with UAW and GM staff. They represented the collective knowledge of 55 General Motors plants and 41 UAW locals in the GM system. They would become known as The Group of 99.